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1. INTRODUCTION
The consistency property has proved very powerful in characterizing some of [he most important
solution concepts in cooperative game theory (see, for example, the characterizations of the core
and the pre-kernel by Peleg (1986), and of the Nash bargaining solution by Lensberg, 1988).')
I3owever, consistency alone does not isolate a unique rule in bankruptcy problems, even after
restricting attention to symmetric, scale-invariant and monotone rules. On the other hand, a
monotone and consistent rule is completely characteriud by a two-person rule and consistency.
Consistency has also been suggested as a valuable guide in designing non-cooperative
mechanisms [hat implement some cooperative solutions (see, for example, Krishna and Serrano,
1990). Namely, extensive forms can be constructed whose subgames relate to the respective
reduced cooperative problems. By concentrating on the subgame-perfect equilibria of such
mechanisms, one can hope to implement the underlying consistent solution. This paper provides
additional support to the idea that consistency is a useful tool in the Nash program for
cooperative games.
Suppose that n~ 2 creditors, whose claims add up to more than the available estate, try
to reach an agreement through decentralized negotiation instead of appealing to a court. We
assume that society has agreed on a certain bilateral principle of justice to solve banktuptcy
problems involving two creditocs, but not on how to deal with multilateral problems; this may
be so because the generalization to n of the bilateral principle is not straightforward, or because
there might be several ways to generalize it. We present a consistency-based non-cooperative
game [hat solves this problem for a large family of bankruptcy rules. In this game, "going to
the bilateral court" can be intetpreted as an outside option for the creditots. What should we
expect from such negotiations?
Our game form generates a wide family of consistent bankruptcy tules presented in the
'For a good survey see Thomson (1990).z
axiomatic theory. It takes a two-person rule as an input and yields the unique consistent
generalization of that rule as an output. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the
game associated with a specific two-person rule is the allocation recommended by the unique
consistent generalization of that rule. In this sense our game forrn operates like the consistency
property in the axiomatic approach, capturing a non-cooperative dimension of consistency in the
framework of bankruptcy problems.
Like other games based on consistency, our game allows for "partial agreements, " where
a player cannot be prevented from getting her offered share if she is happy with it. The question
arises whether such equilibria are coalitionally stable. Could the proposer offer a larger fraciion
of the pie to a creditor and then split it with him? When deviations are "coalitionally credible,"
the answer is no: we show that, for a large class of bankruptcy rules, all the subgame-perfect
equilibria of the game associated with a two-person rule are also coalition-proof. Moreover, for
any rule outside this class, there is a bankruptcy problem and a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the associated game, which is not coalition-proof.
Bankruptcy problems are legal problems. As such, their resolution should take into
account only the legal rights of the creditors and the feasibility constraints. This means that no
other consideration (such as creditors' risk attitudes, wealth and so on) should influence the final
allocation. All bankruptcy rules presented in the literature satisfy this requirement. One further
advantage of our game form is that its equilibrium split is independent of the creditors' utility
functions, as long as these functions are strictly increasing in money. Other mechanisms (see,
for example, Hart and Mas-Colell, 1992) do not satisfy this property when applied to
bankruptcy problems.
The literature on law and economics concentrates on bankruptcy procedures that satisfy3
the principle of absolute prioriry among creditors.Z It is argued there that higher claimants
should have a more active role in the banlwptcy procedure because they are more keenly
motivated to find a satisfactory solution to the problem. In our analysis this principle is derived
as a result if one of our goals is the detetminacy of the procedure: in general, only when the
order of the proposers in the bargaining rounds is detetmined by the amount claimed dces our
mechanism yield a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. Hence, our paper provides a
separate rationale for this principle.
We will assume throughout that the claims are known by everybody (including the
court). As discussed above, our focus is the non-cooperative dimensionofthe consistency axiom
in battktuptcy problems. In a companion piece, we will analyze the related problem of
implementing bankruptcy tvles when the claims are unknown to the court.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the axiomatic treatment of
bankruptcy problems. Section 3 discusses the relation between bilateral principles ofjustice and
consistency. The multilateral non-cooperative model and the main result are presented in Section
4. Coalition-proofness is discussed in Section 5. A result concerning strictly monotone rules is
the object of Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
2. THE AXIOMATIC BANKRUPTCY MODEL
A bankruptcy problem is a pair (E;d) where dE R; is a vector of non-negative real numbers
(claims), indexed by some finite non-empty subset I of natural numbers (creditors), and
0 5 E 5 E;E,d;: - D. E is the estate to be allocated, and D is the sum of the claims.
An allocation in (E;d) is a vector xE R; such that E;E,x; - E and x; 5d; for all iE I. T'he
set of all allocations in (E;d) is denoted by A(E;d).
ZSee Aghion et al. (1992) and Bebchuk (1988).4
Remark: For any list of claims dE R;, any vector x E R; with x; 5 d; is an allocation of
the bankrup[cy problem (E;E,x;;d). Therefore, when there is no danger of confusion, we shall
call any such vector x an allocation without specifying the bankruptcy problem to which it
refers.
A rule is a function that assigns to each bankruptcy problem a uníque allocation.
Examples:
a) The proportional ru[e:
Pr(E;d) - 1`d,
where ~D - E.
The proportional rule, widely applied nowadays, allocates awards in proportion to claim size.
The proportionality principle was favored by the philosophers of ancient Greece, and Aristotle
even considered it as equivalent to justice.
b) The constrained equal award (CEA) rule:
CEA(E;d) - x
where x; - min (~, d;) and )` solves the equation E;E,min (~,d;)-E.3
This rule assigns the same sum to all creditors as long as it dces not exceed each creditor's
claim. This rule is also very ancient, and was adopted by important rabbinical legislators,
including Maimonides.
c) The constrained equal loss (CEL) rule:
CEL(E;d) - x
'This equation has a unique solution when D 1 E. If D-E, any solution ~ is greater than
or equal to the maximum claim and therefore x; - d; for all i.5
where x; - max (0, d;a) ard ~ solves the equation E;E~max (0, d~~)-E.`
This rule assigns losses (d;x;), in the same manner as the CEA assigns awards.
d) The Pirte[es rule:
Pin(E;d) - CEA(min{DI2,E};d12) f CEA(max{E-DIZ,O};d~2).
When the estate dces not excced half the sum of the claims, the Pineles rule assigns each
creditor a fixed amount, as long as it dces not exceed half his claim (otherwise, it assigns him
half his claim). When the estate exceeds half the sum of the claims, it first gives each creditor
half his claim and then divides the remainder (which, by definition, cannot excced half the sum
of the claims) according to the procedure described in the previous sentettce. This rule appears
in Pineles ( 1861, p. 64), and is an interpretation of a controvetsial mishna (Ketuboth 93).
e) The Corttested Garment Consistertt (CGC) rule:
CGC(E;d) - CEA(min{DI2,E};d12) t CEL(max{E-DI2,0};d12).
"I'his rule was proposed by Aumann and Maschler (1985) as an alternative interpretation of the
mishna mentioned above.
f) Equal sacrifice rules:
Let U: R, ,-~R be a continuous and strictly increasing function that satisfies lim,-0 U(x) --oo .
The equal sacrifice tule f relative to U satisfies
f(E;d) - x a 3c Z0 such that viE I with d; ~ 0, U(dJ - U(x~ - c, when E~ 0.
These rules assign awards so as to equaliu absolute sacrifice evaluated according to a
prespecified utility function. Note that the equal sacrifice rule with respect to the logarithmic
function, is the proportional rule. The equal sacrifice principle in taxation appears in Mill (1848,
Book V) and was axiomatically derived by Young (1988).
`This equation has a unique solution when E~O. If E-0, any solution 1, is greater than or
equal to the maximum claim and therefore x; - 0 for all i.6
With a few axceptions that will be indicated, all these rules satisfy the properties discussed
below. We begin wíth some basic ones and devo[e the next section to properties concerning the
concept of consistency.
An allocation x in (E;d) is said to be orderpreserving if for all creditors i and j, if d; Sd~
then x;5 x~ and d;x; 5d~x~. If we call d;x; the loss of creditor i, in any order preserving
allocation, the order of creditors by claims, awards and losses is the same.
Remark: Order-preserving allocations are symmetric in the sense that ifd;-d~ then x;-x~.
A rule is orderpreserving (symmetric) if it always assigns order-preserving (symmetric)
allocations.s
A rule f is consistent if for any finite non-empty set I of creditors
for all (E;d), dER;, for all 0~JCI,
f(E;d) - x~ x~J - f(E;E~x;, d~J) (1.1)
where when yE R;, y ~ J is the projection of y on R;.
A weaker condition is bilatera! consistency, which requires (1.1) only for subsets J
containing exactly two creditors. The interpretation of consistency is as follows. Suppose that
a rule f assigns allocation x to the bankruptcy problem (E;d). Suppose also that some subset of
creditors wants to reallocate the total amount E4,x; assigned to them. If we apply the same rule
f to allocate this amount among these creditors, each will get the amount originally assigned to
him, pmvided f is consistent. Consistency in the setup of bankruptcy problems was first
discussed by Aumann and Maschler (1985) and further analyzed by Young (1987, 1988).
A rule f is monotone if for all (E;d) and 0 5 E' S E, f(E';d) 5 f(E;d). Monotonicity says
that a decrease in the estate dces not benefit any creditor. A rule f is strictty monotone if for
SEqual sacrifice rules with respe.ct to non-concave utility functions are not necessarily order
preserving in losses.7
all (E;d) and 0 ~ E' G E, if d; ~ 0 then f;(E';d) G f;(E;d). Strict monotonicity says that a
decrease in the estate leaves every non-zero creditor wotse off. The rules in the above
examples, with the exception of the proportional and equal sacrifice rules, do not satisfy strict
monotonicity.
A rule f is supermodular if for all (E;d) and OSE' SE, if d;5d; then f;(E;d)-f;(E';d) 5
f~(E;d)-fj(E';d). A supermodular rule allocates each additional shekel in an "order preserving"
manner.b
The following lemmas will be useful in the rest of the paper.
LEMtvtA 2.1: Any supermodular tule f is order preserving.
Prooj: Let x- f(E;d) and let i and j be two creditors with d;5d~.
x; - f;(E;d) - f;(E;d) - 0- f;(E;d) - f;(O;d) 5 f;(E;d) - f;(O;d) - f;(E;d) - x;. The previous
inequality follows from the supermodularity of f. Analogously we have
d;x; - f;(D;d) - f;(E;d) 5 f;(D;d) - f;(E;d) - d;-x;.
LEwtMn 2.2: Let (E;d) be a banktvptcy problem and let i be a creditor with the highest claim.
If f is supetmodular and O S E' G E, then f;(E;d) 1 f;(E';d). That is, i's award is strictly
monotone in the estate.
Proof: Trivial.
óEqual sacrifice tvles relative to non-concave utility functions are not rtecessarily
supermodular.8
3. ON BILATERAL COMPARISONS, IUSTICE AND CONSISTENCY
Since every bankruptcy problem is a legal problem, its solu[ions should be guided by the
principle of justice. Whatever form this principle may take, it should enable us to determine
whether any one creditor received better or worse treatment than another at any given
allocation. For example, if we believe, like Aristotle, that justice is proportionaliry, then we
would say that i is treated better than j at allocation x if i receives a larger proportion of his
claim than j dces. According to this principle of justice, an allocation will treat i and j equally
if they receive the same proportion of their claims. Obviously, we can think of other notions
of justice, but in order to make these pairwise comparisons we clearly need only a bilateral
principle.
A bilateralprinciple is a function that assigns a unique allocation to every two-person
bankruptcy problem. We interpret this unique allocation as the just solution to the problem. We
shall say that any other allocation in a two-person problem treats one creditor better than the
other since it awards one creditor more than his "fair" share. Any rule, when applied to two-
person problems, is an example of a bilateral principle. Conceptually, however, bilateral
principles differ from two-person allocation rules. The former single out a just allocation that
permits pairwise comparisons, while the latter allocate the estate in two-person problems.
Given a bankruptcy problem (E;d) and a bila[eral principle f, we shall say that an
allocation x treats i and j f-equa[ty if (x;,x~)-f[x;tx~;(d;,d~)]. An allocation in (E;d) is said to
be f-just if it treats every two creditors f-equally. Aumann and Maschler (1985) showed that if
a bilateral principle f is monotone, then there is at most one f-just allocation for each bankruptcy
problem. If a unique f-just allocation exists for any bankruptcy problem, then we can define the
fjust rule to be the rule that assigns to each bankruptcy problem its unique f-just allocation.
We explore some relations between fjustice and consístency.9
LFMMA 3.1: I.et g be a monotone bilateral principle and f be the g-just rule, then f is consistent.
ProoJ: See Aumann and Maschler (1985).
LEMMA 3.2: Le[ f be a monotone and bilateral consistent tule, and let g be the bilateral
principle induced by f. Then f is the gjust rule.
Proof: Trivial.
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 imply that the g-just rule is the uitique consistent rtrle that coincides
with the brlateralprinciple g in two-creditor problems.
Given a consistent, monotone and supermodular tvle f, a list of claims d and an
allocation x 5 d, we can define the following binary relation on the set of creditors I:
~„ - {(i,j)EIxI ~ f;[x;fx~;(d;,d~]Cx;}.'
i~,j means that x treats i f-better than j. Note that in order to define the relation we only need
the bilateral principle induced by f. Obviously, if i~,j then f;(x;tx~;(d;,d;)] ~ x;. Note that if i~,j,
then i~,j for any other allocation y in which y;-x; and y;-x;. That is, whether or not i~,j is
independent of the amounts assigned by x to other creditors.
We define the relations zs and -~ by replacing c in the defmition of ~1 with 5 and
- respectively. These relations have the obvious intetpretation.
There are some interesting properties that the relations just defined satisfy:
LEMMA 3.3: Let f be a consistent and monotone rule, let (E;d) be a banlcntptcy problem and
'For i-j, we define f;[x;fz~;(d;,d~] as z;.10
let x~` be its f-just allocation. Let x be an allocation in (E;d) in which there are two creditors
i and j with x; 5 x' and x~ z xj. Then, j zxi. Moreover, if both inequalities are strict, then j~xi.
Proof:
Case 1: x;-Ex~ z x~` f x~`. By monotonicity and consistency,
f;[x;fx~;(d;,d~)]~f;[x]`tx~`;(d;,d~)]-x~`zx;. Hence, jz~i.
Case 2: x; fx~ G x]` f x~`. By monotonicity and consistency,
fj[x;fx~;(d;,d~)]Sfj[x?`fx';(d;,dt)]-z~`Sx~. Hence, jzxi.
This proves the first part of the claim. As for the second part, it is proved analogously and is
left to the reader. a
This lemma says that the f-just allocation of a bankrvptcy problem is a good benchmark
for bilateral comparisons: if at some allocation x player i gets more than the fjust allocation
assigns to him and if player j gets less than his f-just share, then at x i must be receiving better
treatment than j.
LEMMn 3.4: L.et f be a consistent and monotone rule, let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem anci
let x be an allocation in (E;d). Then, ~~ is transitive.
Proof: Let i, j and k be three creditors such that i ~,j and j~xk. Define the following 3-creditor
bankruptcy problem: (E';d'):-[x;fx~fxr;(d;,d~,dk)]. Define x~` as the f-just allocation of this
problem. It must be the case that x~ G xt. Otherwise, sincej~,k, by lemma 3.3 z;1 x' and since
i~~j, by the same lemma x; ~ x~ contradicting the fact that x;tx~fxk-x~ fx;` fx~. Analogously,
it must be that x;1 xfi. Hence by lemma 3.3 i~,k. o11
l.emma 3.4 says that the relation z, is quasi-tmnsitive. Hence, Sen's ( 1969) lemma 1
implies that z, satisfies the following pmperty: if iz~j and j~,k or if i~,j and jz:k, then iz~k.
(For convenience, we shall call this latter property quasi-transitivity.) On the other hand, note
that when the rule f is not strictly monotone, t, is not transitive. To see this, consider the
following banlwptcy problem: (E;d):-[400;(300, 200, 100)] and the following allocation:
x-(160, 140, 100). When f is the constrained equal award rule it is easy to see that 2z,3, 3t,1
but 1 ~,2.
LEMMA 3.5: Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem, let f be a consistent attd motwtone rule and
let x be an allocation in (E;d). If there exists a creditor i such that for all j, i-,j then
x;-f;(E;d).
Proof: If x; ~f;(E;d) then there exists a croditor j with x; G f;(E;d). Hence, by lemma 3.3, i ~~j
contradicting the assumption of the lemma. Analogously, if x; G fi(E;d) there exists a creditor
j with j ~,i. o
LEMMA 3.6: Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy probkm, let f be a consistent, monotone and
supetmodular rule and let x be an allocation in (E;d). Let i be a creditor with the highest claim.
If for all creditors j, i-,j then x-f(E;d).
Proof By lemma 3.5, x;-f;(E;d). Now assume there ezists a ctnditor j with x)Gf;(E;d). By
consistency, supermodularity attd lemtna 2.2, i~~j contradicting the assumption. So it must be
that for all j, x;Zf;(E;d). Sittce x is an allocation, this implies that x-f(E;d). oiz
Lemma 3.6 says that if an allocation is such that all creditors are treated f-equally to one
with a maximum claim, then this allocation is the f-just allocation. Thus, only n-1 equations are
needed to calculate the f-just allocation of any n-credi[or bankruptcy problem.
We have seen that the relation ~x is not an order. We now define a complete order on
the set of creditors, which will be useful in the rest of the paper.
Let (E;d) be a given bankruptcy problem. We assume that the creditors are ordered by
size of claim, that is, if iGj then d;?d~. Without loss of generality we shall call the creditor
with the lowest index "creditor 1". Let x be a given allocation in (E;d). We associate to x the
following vector: wER; where w;:-f;[x,fx;;(d„d;)]. The amount w; is what creditor i would
get if we allocate x,fx; f-justly between creditors 1 and i. Note that w is not in general an
allocation in (E;d). Now define the following binary relation on the set uf creditors:
Definition: iR,j p w;-x;~w~-x~ or, w;-x;-w~-x~ and i?j.
Clearly, R, is a complete order, i.e., it is complete, transitive and antisymmetric.
In order to understand what the relation Rx means, note that w~-x~ is the amount that
creditor 1 should add to x~ if we wanted to divide x, fx~ f-equally between I and j. We then say
that iR,j if creditor 1 must give more money to creditor i than to creditor j when compensating
them for the f-injustice inherent in the allocation x. If these monetary compensations are equal,
then iR,j means that i?j.
4. A MULTILATERAL NON-COOPERATIVE MODEL
Let (E;d) be a given bankruptcy problem. Throughout in this section and Section 5 wc shall
assume that [he creditots are ordered by size of claim, that is, if i Gj then d; ? d~. Wc are
interested in defining an extensive form game for each bilateral principle f. The game, denoted
by G`(E;d), is defined recursively. If there is one creditor, he receives the whole estate and the13
game is over. Assume the game is already defined for all bankruptcy problems with at most n-1
creditors, the game for n creditors is defined as follows: The first creditor (the otte with the
lowest index) proposes an allocation x in A(E;d); following this proposal all the other creditors
have to respond simultaneously, either accepting or rejecting the offer. An accepting creditor
i, gets z;-x; and leaves the game. Let Y be the set of accepting creditors, N be the set of
rejecting creditors, and 1 be the proposer. The proposer receives z,-(E-EiEYxi)-
E;E Nf;[x, fx;;(d„d;)]. The rejecting creditors go on to the garne corresponding to the bankruptcy
problem (E-E;~NZ;;d ~ N).
The interpretation of the rules of the game is as follows: the first creditor (one with a
highest claim) proposes an allocation x. If it is uttanimously accepted, the estate is divided
according to x. Otherwise, those who accepted the offer get their shares and those who rejected
it "renegotiate" bilaterally with the proposer. In these bilateral renegotiations, each rejecting
creditor i"bargains" with the proposer 1 for his fair share of the amount x, f x;. We assume
that the bilateral principle f is commonly accepted in society, or that resorting to litigation is
an outside option for the creditors: the proposer is held to be responsible for his offer, in the
sense that all creditors who are unhappy with it have the right to be compensated in accordance
to the bilateral principle. The rejecting creditors go on bargaining on the sum of the amounts
awarded to them in the bilateral reregotiations. The proposer gets the remainder of the estate
after all the other creditors t~eceived their shares."
We also study an alternative version ofthe gatne that ettsures feasibility. In this version,
when the proposer's residual amount is negative, he teceives 0 atd the rejecting creditors kcep
bargaining over what is left after paying the acceptors. The analysis will concentrate on the l-irst
"Tttis remainder can be negative. However, it is shown in lettttna 4.1 below that the
proposer can always guarantee a tan-negative amount.14
version. With some minor modifications, the uniqueness part of the proof of Theorem 1 will
also apply to the second version. Existence requires a separate treatment.
Although the payoffs are given in monetary terms, it is not necessary to assume that the
creditors' utilities are linear in money. Our results are insensitive to the choice of the utility
representation as long as it is strictly increasing in money, that is, risk preferences do not affect
the result.
The introduction of the bilateral principle to calculate the proposer's payoff may seem
arbitrary. However, we want to emphasize that our purpose is not to characterize a certain
consistent rule or any bilateral principle; rather, we are interes[ed more in the relations of the
bilateral principles and their consistent generalizations than in characterizing any specific
bilateral principle. For a model in which the bilateral principle dces not appear in the extensive
fotm game see Serrano (1993), who characterized the contested garment consistent rule.
Now we are ready to state the tnain result of this paper.
THEOREM 1: I.et (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem and let f be a consistent, monotone and
supermodular rule. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of G~(E;d) is f(E;d).
Some remarks are in order.
1) The theorem holds for the case in which the proposers are ordered by the size of their
claims. For other orders uniqueness is not obtained (see Example 6.1 in Section 6). Therefore,
if the determinacy of the model is a desideratum, the principle of absolute priority among
creditors should be applied to the choice of the order of proposers. However, as will be shown
in Section 6, for strictly monotone rules, the order of proposers is of no importance.
2) The result dces not use any refinement of the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium. This is15
similar to results that relate non-cooperative models with pure bargaining problems, as in
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). When the underlying cooperative model is more
complex, as in general cooperative games, a refinement is usually needed in order to get
uniyueness (see, for example, Hart and Mas-Colell, 1992; and Gul, 1989).
3) Unlike some other models, which provide a non~ooperative view of a cooperative solution
concept, our result yields a non-cooperative view of a lazge family of allocation rules for
bankruptcy problems. The two critical properties that characterize this famíly are consistency
and monotonicity. These two properties guarantee that the allocation assigned by the consistent
rule can be supported by a Nash equilibrium. These properties are the ones that drive the results
of otherconsistency-based non-cooperative mechanisms (see, for example, Krishna and Serrano,
1990; and Chae and Yang, 1989).
4) Our result holds for the whole family of bankruptcy problems. This is in contrast to other
models, such as those mentioned in the previous remark, where the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcomes converge to the Nash bargaining solution agreement for "dividing a
dollar" bargaining problems, in which the Nash solution is monotone (see Chun and Thomson
(1988)). The reason why these models do not yield a similaz result in all bargaining pmblems
becomes apparent: the Nash bargaining solution is not monotone in general.9
5) The unique equilibrium agrcement is not achieved immediately in all the subgame-perfect
equilibria of the game, even though there always exists an equilibrium in which the agreement
is immediate. This feature of the model is consistent with the consistency principle. As we
know, after applying a consistent rule any subset ofagents is indifferent betwcen accepting their
9When the Nash solution is not monotone, the strategies proposed by Krishna and Serrano,
or by Chae and Yang do not constitute even a Nash equilibrium. The pmposer could futd a
profitable deviation by offering more than his equilibritun share to one of the responders, in the
hope of benefiting fmm a bigger share in a smaller remaining pie.16
shares and renegotiating among themselves.
6) Tlte possibe emergertce of a stepwise agreement in equilibrium is due to the fact that there
is no cost for renegotiation, such as discounting, fixed renegotiation fees or the random
elimination of players.
7) The fact that random devices are not used in the model has two advantages. Firstly, risk
preferences do not affect the outcome, and secondly, the mechanism is more realistic (legal
procedures in civilized economies typically do not use random devices).
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof follows from the following series of lemmas.
We denote f(E;d) by x' and equilibrium outcomes by z.
LEMMn 4.1: In any Nash equilibrium of G~(E;d), z, z x~`.
Proof Creditor I can guarantee a payoff of x~` simply by proposing x'. It is easy to see that
whatever the replies, he will get exac[ly x!.
We prove uniqueness by induction on the number of creditors. For one-creditor
problems, the unique SPE outcome is x'. Suppose then that Theorem 1 is true for all problems
with at most n-1 creditors.
LENthtn 4.2: If Theorem 1 holds for all bankruptcy problems with less than n creditors, then
for all bankruptcy problems with exactly n creditors there exists at most one subgame-perfeci
equilibrium outcome which is x'-f(E;d).
Proof L.et (E;d) be an n-creditor bankruptcy problem and let a be a subgame-perfect
equilibrium with outcome z. Denote by x the equilibrium offer of the first proposer. Since z is
an equilibrium outcome,z~ Zx~ for all j~ 1




Denote by N the set of creditors who reject the offer x and by Y the set of accepting creditors.
If N- PJ , by lemma 4.1 x, -z, Z x'. If there exists a responding creditor k with xk G xk, then
by supermodularity and monotonicity of f, 1 ~~Ic. Hence if he refuses offer x, his payoff will
increase, which contradicts the assumption that k plays a best response. Hence x zx~ and since
x is an allocation, z-x-x'.
Now we turn to the case where N~ 0. In this case, by the induction hypothesis,
z ~ N-f(EiENwi,d ~ N) 2 x ~ N, where the last inequality follows from (4.1). Hence, by lemma A.3,
1 z,i for all i E N and by lemma A.1 (see appendix) applied to the bankruptcy problem
(x,fEiENxi~d~NU{1}) we have
z, 5 f,(x,fEiENXi~d ~ N U{1}) (4.3),
which by (4.2) implies x! 5z, Sf,(x, -F~EiENXi~d ~ NU{1}). Hence by consistency, monotonicity
and supermodularity of f, x,fZ;iENxiZx'fEiENX~. It also follows from (4.3) that
~iENZi ~~iE Nf;(x, f EiENXi~d ~ N V{ 1}) and by consistency and monotonicity
~iENZiZ EiENfi(x, f.Fi;E,~X;~d I NU{ 1}) Z F.iENx} . Ag81n, by the induction hypothesis, COnSIStenCy
and monotonicity we have f(EiENZi~d ~ N)-z~ N zx' ~N.
Next we show that z ~ Y: -x~ Y Zx' ~ Y. Assume by contradiction that there exists kE Y
such that zk-xk G xr. Since z; zx~ for all iE N, by lemma 3.3, i z~ic for all i E N. Consider the
subgame in which k rejects the offer x. Denote by vER"u{ki the subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome after this deviation. By the inductionhypothesis v-f(wk fEiENZi:d ~ NU{k}). Since this
is a deviation from subgame-perfect equilibrium, it must be that vk 5zk. By lemma 3.3 and
lemma 2.2, 1~,k, which implies EiENU{kjVi~~iENU{klzi. T~ ~Plies that v;~z; for some jEN.18
Now we have, v~ 1 zt ?x;~ and vk ~zt G xk. Therefore, by lemma 3.3, j~~k which contradicts the
fact that v is an f-just allocation. Hence z ~ Y z x' ~ Y. Finally, we have z? x~` but since
E;E,z;-E;E,x~`, z-x' which completes the proof.
Lstrtntn 4.3: If Theorem 1 holds for all bankruptcy problems with less than n creditors, then
for all bankruptcy problems with exactly n creditors there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Let (E;d) be an n-creditor banktuptcy probtem. We shall construct an equilibrium:
The first proposer proposes f(E;d). To any proposal x, the responders answer according to the
following algorithm:
[insert Figure 1 here]
For any proposal x, all creditors who, according to the algorithm, belong to the set N
when the algorithm reaches the end, reject x and all the rest accept it. In any subsequent stage,
the players play according to some prespecified subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game
corresponding to the bankruptcy problem reduced to the set N, whích will have less than n
creditors.
Recall that for any proposal x, w; is i's fjust share of the amount x,tx; when it is
divided between creditors 1 and i. In our game w; is the amount creditor i will contribute to the
sum to be divided among all the rejecting creditors if he decides to reject the offer. At each
stage of the algorithm Y is the set of potential acceptors, N is the set of virtual rejecters and M
is a subset of Y which we call the "wai[ing list". In the beginning, all responding creditors are
potential acceptors and no one is in the waiting list.
At any stage the algorithm chooses a candidate to join the set of rejecters among the
potential acceptors who are not in the waiting list. The algorithm chooses candidate c to be the19
R,-maximal creditor in Y`M. He is then asked whether he wants to join the set of virtual
rejecters under the assumption that all other creditors will remain in their respective sets, i.e.,
all creditors in N will reject x attd all the other creditors in Y will accept it. Under this
assumption, if candidate c joins N, he will get, given the equilibrium strategies in the following
stages of the game, g~-f~(w~fE,ENW,;d~NU{c}). If 6e does not join N, he will get x~.
We assume that c joins the set of virtual rejecters (thereby leaving the set of potential
acceptors) only if g~ 1 x~. In this case the waiting list is reset to be empty. If the candidate dces
not join N, he joins the waiting list M. After c joines either M or N, another candidate is
chosen according to the same criterion, and offered the opportunity to join the set of virtual
rejecters. This process continues until there are no more potential accepting creditors or until
all of them are on the waiting list. Then, according to the algorithm, all creditors in N reject
x and all the creditors in Y accept it.
Note that a creditor who joined the set of virtual rejecters will never leave it. On the
other hand, all those who could have joined N but did not do so are given a chance to
reconsider only after some other creditor joined N. This, together with the fact that in every
stage there is one creditor who joins either N or the waiting list, makes the algorithm end after
a finite number of stages.
We claim that the n-tuple of strategies induced by the algorithm constitutes a subgame-
perfect equilibrium. It is clear that all those who, according to the algorithm, accept x are
playing a best response, since each was invited to join the rejecters separately and refused to
do so.
As for the rejecters, in order to prove the optimality of their strategies, we need two
lemmas.zo
L~t[vtn 4.3.1: Consider a stage in the algorithm where creditor c is asked whether he wants to
join the set of rejecters. If he chooses to join the set of rejecters, proposal x dces not treat him
better than any creditor in the waiting list, i.e., if f~(w~tE;ENw;;d~NU{c})~x~ then j~xc for
all jEM.
Proo,~ Let j be a creditor in M and define the allocations g and h as follows:
g:- f(w~fEiENwi.d~NU{c}) and h:- f(w;fEiENwi;d~NU{j}).
By the assumption,
lx1~. (4.4)
Since h is the payoff that all members of N and j would have received had they been the only
refusers of proposal x, and since j belongs to M, we conclude that he refused to join N when
he was asked to,which means
lt~ S x~. (4.5)
By construction of the algorithm, jR,c. It must be that
w~h~zw~z~ Zw~x~ 1 w~g~,
where the first inequality follows fmm (4.5), the second from the fact that jR,c, and the last
follows from (4.4). Hénce
~iENiti-EiENwi}(wj'y'~~iENwi}(wcgc)-~iENgi.
Therefore, there exists a ct~editor k in N such that ht ~ gr.
Now define the following allocation: (y~, yt, y~: -(x~, hk, x;).
Since x~c g~ and gkc hk, and since g is an fjust allocation, it follows from lemma 3.3 that k~YC.
Analogously, since x~ztt~ and since 6 is an f-just allocation, it follows from lemma 3.3 that
jz~,k. Hence, by quasi-transitivity of z~, j zrc which is equivalent to j~xc.
LEMtan 4.3.2: Consider a stage in the algorithm where creditor c is invited to join the set ofzi
rejecters. If he accepts (joins the set of rejecters), then fj(w~fE,ENW,;d~NU{c})zx; for all
jE N, [hat is, those who already decided to reject are still happy with their decision even after
c joined them.
Proof: By induction on the number of creditots in N. If N-0 the statement is true. Assume
now that f(EiENwi,d~N)zx~N. Let g:- f(w~tEiENWi~d~NU{c}).
Case 1: w~ z g~. Then by consistency and monotonicity, g ~ N z f(E,ENWi;d ~ N) zx ~ N.
Case 2: w~Cg~. Pick jE N. Since g is an fjust allocation, it follows from lemma 3.3 that either
wisg~ or j~„c.
We also know (by lemma A.3) that w;zx;. hence, if g~ Zw~ we conclude that g;zx;.
Othetwise, if j~„c, by lemma A.2 (see appendix), cI~j, which implies that there was a stage
in which j joined the set of rejecters and c was in the waiting list M. Hetrx, by lemma 4.3.1,
cz,j. Since g is an f-just allocation and sittce g~1xc, lettuna 3.3 implies that g~ zxj.
Lemma 4.3.2 shows that all cttiditots in N play best n.sponses by rejecting offer x,
assuming that they are the only rejecters. This also holds for N when the algorithm reaches the
end and shows that every rejecter is playing a best nrsponse to any offer x given the responses
of the others.
As for the pmposer, if he proposes x' he will receive exactly x~ since according to the
algorithm every responder will accept his proposal. Hettce we have to show that if he proposed
x~x', the amount z, he would rective is not larger than x~. Assutne by contradiction that if
he proposes x he receives z, ~ x~`. Since we have already shown that all respondets are playing
best responses to any offer x, we can use arguments analogous to tlx ones used in lemma 4.2:
Let N be the set of creditors that according to the algorithm reject offer x, and let Y be the setz2
of accepting creditors. It can be shown that, since z, ~x~, it must be that N is non-empty and
Ihál X~ C Z, S f,(X, f Fi;ENX;;d ~N U{ 1}). It follows that x, tE;E NXi 1 xÍ~ }~iENX~. Th1S ImpheS that
there exists a creditor k E Y with xk G xk, which is impossible. o
Remark: Although the proof of uniqueness for the alternative model that ensures
feasibility applies with minor modifications, the above algorithm dces not necessarily yield a
SPE. However, since monotone rules are continuous in the estate, we can show the existence
of a SPE in which the responses may require randomizations. This is so because the existence
problem amounts to asking whether the proposer's problem of finding the proposal that
maximizes his payoff has a solution.
The following propositions outline some interesting properties of the SPE of our model.
They will also be useful in the next secdon.
P[toPOSrrtoN 1: Let a be a subgame-perfect equilibrium and let x be the equilibrium offer of
creditor 1. Denote by N the set of creditors who, according to a, reject x. Then this equilibrium
offer satisfies
w;:-f;(x,fx;;(d,,dJ)-x~` for all iEN.
Proof: Since x is an equilibrium offer and since by Theorem 1 the equilibrium outcome is x~,
it must be that for all i~ 1 x; 5 x~, and for creditor 1, x, Zx'. This implies, by consistency and
monotonicity of f, that
w;:-f;(x,fx;;(d,,dJ)zxrt for all i;tl.
Now, if we denote by z the equilibrium outcome, we have
(4.6)
~iENTi-~iENwi-~iENx~. (4.7)23
It follows dircctly from (4.6) and (4.7) tha[ w,-z;-x! for all iE N. o
PttoPOSIT1oN 2: L.et a be a subgame-perfect equilibrium and let x be any offer of creditor 1.
Denote by N and Y the set of creditors who, according to a, reject and accept the offer x,
respectively. Then for any creditor kE Y and any creditor j E N, kz~j.
Proof: Let k be a creditor in Y and let j be a creditor in N. Assume by contradiction that j~xk.
It follows from Theorem 1 that the rejecters receive z-f(EiENwi.d~N). Since a is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium, it must be [hat z zx ~ N. Thus, by lemma A.3 (in the appendix), 1 z~j.
Therefore, by quasi-transitivity 1 z:lt. Consider a deviation in which cn~itor k rejects x. Denote
by z' the payoffs of the rejecting ct~editors after this deviation. By 1'heorem 1,
z' -f(w, fE,FNWi;d ~ N U{k}). Since a is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, z; 5 xk. This, together
with lz,k implies that E,ENZi~EiENwi. Hence, by consistency and monotonicity, zjzz;Zx;.
We therefore have zr 5 xk and z~ zx~ and since z' is an f-just allocadon lemma 3.3 implies kz,j,
contradicting the initial assumption. q
5. COALITIONAL STABILITY OF THE EQUILIBRIA
In the game presented in Section 4 creditors may exit with the share awarded to them simply
by accepting the proposal. The question arises whether the equilibria are coalitionally stable.
Could the proposer offer a larger share of the pie to a responder in the hope of profiting from
a joint deviation? We first consider any kind of coalitional deviation and ask if the equilibria
of our model are strong Nash (Aumann, 1959). This requites that no coalition of players has
a joint deviation which leaves all its members better off. The subgame-perfect equilibria of our
model are not strong. This is illustrated in the following example.24
Example 5.1: Consider the bankruptcy problem (E;d)-[99; (100, 100, 100)]. Since this
problem is symmetric, for all symmetric rules the game G~(E;d) is the same. Clearly, the fjust
allocation in this problem is (33, 33, 33). Consider the following deviation by the first two
creditors: The proposer offers x-(0, 98, 1), and the second creditor, who was offered 98
shekels, rejects it. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, the responders must accept
this offer leaving the pmposer with a payoff of 0. This shows that x is indeed an off-equilibrium
offer and that rejecting it is an off~qttilibrium response. This deviation yields the outcome
z-(49, 49, 1), in which the deviating creditors receive 16 shekels more than they would have
received in any subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Note that although this deviation improves creditor 2's payoff relative to the f-just
allocation, he is playing a dominated strategy in the subgame that follows 1's offer. This makes
the above deviation unstable. Examples of this sort motivated the alternative concept of
coalitional stability known as coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, introduced by Bernheim, Peleg
and Whinston ( 1987).
The following definition refers to games in normal form, G-(I, (SJ;E,,(g');E,), where I
is the set of players, S; is the strategy set of player i and g' is the payoff function of player i.
Let J be a coalition, that is fI~ ~JC I. We denote S,-II;E,S;. Also, if aES: -II;E,S; is a list of
strategies, a, denotes the restriction of a to coalition J. Given a game G, a list a of strategies
(one for each player) and a coalition J ofplayers, an internally consistent improvement ofJupon
a is defined by induction on ~ J ~. If J-{i} for some i in I, then r;E S; is an internally consistent
improvement of J upon a íf g'(r;,ant;~) ~ g'(a). If ~J ~~ 1 then r, E S, is an internally consistent
improvement upon a if (i) g'(r,,a,~,)1g'(a) for all i in J, attd (ii) no Tc.T, T~ 0 has an internally
consistent impmvement upon (r,,or,). o is a coalition proofNash equilibrium if no JC I, J~ QJ,
has an internally consisunt improvement upon a.25
In contrast to strong Nash, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium requires that no coalition
should have a profitable and self-enforcing deviation. Unfortunately, there are bankruptcy rules
and bankruptcy problems for which not all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the associated game
are coalition-proof. This is shown in the following example:
Example 5.2: Consider the 5-creditor banktuptcy problem (E;d)-[160; (100, 100, 10,
10, 10)]. Let f be the constrained equal loss rule. As can easily be calculated, the f-just
allocation in this problem is (80, 80, 0, 0, 0). Consider the offer x-(100, 60, 0, 0, 0). Assume
that the responders follow the algorithm presented in the previous section and always propose
the f-just allocation when it is their turn to propose. This amounts to saying that the second
creditor will reject the offer and the others will accept it. As the reader can verify, the offer x
and these responses are the equilibrium path of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of our game that
yields the fjust allocation as an outcome.
From these strategies, consider the joint deviation ofthe three smallest creditors in which
all of them reject the equilibrium offer x. This deviation will lead to a subgame in which the
four rejecting creditors will get f[95;(100, 10, 10, 10)]-(91l4, 1',4, 1'k, 1'k). Note thatunlike
the deviation in example 5.1, this one is self-enforcing.
In the above example, offer x treats all the respondíng creditors f-equally. Further, if
a small creditor rejects the offer, he would gain an additional five shekels from the proposer in
the bilateral renegotiations. However, in the next stage of the game, the large rejecting creditor
would be the only one to benefit from this additional amount. Naturally, if f was strictly
monotone, this could not happen. It tutns out that a weaker property, which we call quasi-strict
monotonicity, is sufficient to rule out such phenomena.
A tule f is quasi-strictly monotone if it is monotone and if for all bankruptcy problems
(E;d), 0 5 E' G E and f;(E';d) Gd; implies f;(E';d) G f;(E;d). Quasi-strict monotonicity says that26
an increase in the estate will benefit all creditors unless they already received their whole claim.
Obviously, all strictly monotone rules are also quasi-strictly monotone. In addition, the CEA
rule, for example, is quasi-strictly monotone as well.
This property ensures that all the subgame-perfect equilibria in our model are coalition-
proof. Moreover, quasi-strict monotonicity is also a necessary condition for coalition-proofness
of the subgame-perfect equilibria in our model. That is, if a rule is not quasi-strictly monotone,
an example (similar to example 5.2) of a subgame-perfect equilibrium which is not coalition-
proof can be constntcted. This is formally stated as follows:
THEOREM 2: Let f be a consistent, monotone and supetmodular tvle. For all bankruptcy
pmblems (E;d), all the subgame-perfect equilibria of G`(E;d) are coalition-proof íf and only if
f is quasi-strictly monotone.
Proof of Theorem 2: Sufficiency: The proof is by induction. For 2-creditor problems all Nash
equilibria are coalition-proof since in this case the game G`(E;d) is a constant-sum game.
Assume that for all pmblems with less than n creditors all subgame-perfect equilibria are
coalition-proof and let (E;d) be an n-ct~editor bankruptcy problem. It is sufficient to show that
for each subgame-perfect equilibrium o, ta coalition J has a profitable joint deviation that
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in G`(E;d) ~ a.~. First note that the grand coalition has no such
deviation since G`(E;d) is a constant-sum game.
Lemma 5.1: Let a be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of G`(E;d) and assume that there exists a
coalition J that has a self-enforcing profitable deviation. 1'hen, creditor 1 is a member of J.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that there is a coalition J, in which 1 is not a member, that has27
a self-enforcing profitable deviation. Let x be the equilibrium offer of creditor 1 according to
a, let z be the respective equilibrium outcome and denote by Y and N the set of accepting and
rejecting a-editors of x, respectively, according to o. By Proposition 1, w;-z;-x!` for all iEN.
Since x is an equilibrium offer and since by Theorem 1 the equilibrium outcome is x~`, it must
be that for all i~ l x;5 x' and for creditor 1, x, Z x!. This implies, by consistency and
monotonicity of f that
w,: -f,(x, fx;;(d,,d;)) zxj` for all i~ 1. (5.1)
Now let kE Y. It must be that wt- xk. For if wr 1 xk, then xk G dr. But then, quasi-strict
monotonicity of f and Theorem 1 imply that k can profitably deviate by saying no. Hence we
conclude that
w;-z;-x' for all i~ 1. (5.2)
Now, since x;5 x~ for all i~ 1 and creditor 1 is not a deviator, it must be that all deviators
reject the offer. Thus, by the induction hypothesis and (5.2) it follows that after the deviation
all rejecting creditors, including the deviators, will receive z'- f(E;EN.W,;d~N') -
f(E;EN.X~`;d ~ N') - x' ~ N', where N' is the set of creditors Ihat actually rejected offer x in the
deviation. This contradicts the assumption that the deviation was profitable.
Lemma 5.2: Let a be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of G`(E;d) and assume that there exists a
coalition J that has a self-enforcing profitable deviation. Then, creditor 1 is not a member of
l.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that there is a coalition J, in which 1 is a member, that has a
self-enforcing profitable deviation. Let x be 1's offer according to the deviation and let z be the
outcome following the deviation. Denote by Y and N the set of accepting and rejecting creditors
of x, respectively, according to o and denote by Y' and N' the actual set of accepting and28
rejectíng creditors, respectively.
First we claim that w;:-f;(x,fx;;(d,,dJ)zx; for all iEN'. By lemma A.3, this claim
holds for all iEN and since the deviation is self~nforcing, by an argument similar to the one
used in lemma A.3, it holds for the deviators too.
Further note that there must be a deviating credítor who belongs to N and therefore to
Y'. To see this note that if all responding creditors stick to their equilibrium strategies, the
proposer will receive no more than x!. But since the proposer is a deviator he receives, after
the deviation, more than x!. Since for all rejecting creditors in N', w; Zx;, this can only be
possible if some of the creditors who were supposed to say No according to the equilibrium
strategy say Yes.
All deviating creditors receive more than their equilibrium shares. This implies that
x;1 xrt for all deviating creditors in Y'. By Proposition 2, lemma 3.3, and the fact that there are
some deviating creditors in Y', it follows that for ail iEY' x;~x!. Therefore, E;EY'xi~ E~erx'.
Hence, x, tE;EN.z; c x!fE;EN.X~`. Slnce X,1 X~, N' is non-empty. This together with the fact
that w; Zx; for all i E N' and lemma A.3, implies that 1's payoff is no more than
f,(x,tE;EN.X;;d~N'U{1}) which by consistency and monotonicity cannot exceed x;`. This
contradicts the assumption that 1 is a member of a coalition with a profitable deviation. This
concludes the sufficiency part.
Necessity: Let f be a consistent, monotone and supermodular rule that is not quasi-stricdy
monotone. Then, there exist bankruptcy problems (E;d) and (E';d) with E 1 E' and two
creditors i and j such that x;:-f;(E;d)-f;(E';d):-y;cd; and x~:-f;(E;d)1f;(E';d):-y;. By
consistency, x; - f;(z;fx~;(d;,d;)) - f;(y;-fy;;(d;,d;)) - y; and x; - fj(x;-1-x~;(d;,d~)) ,
f;(y;fy;;(d;,d~) - y~. Note that supetmodularity implies that dt~d;.29
L.et a~`:-sup {fj(atx;;(d;,d~))~f;(a~-x;;(d;,d~))-x;}.
a~ is the "maximum" amount that creditor j can get in any bankruptcy problem, given that
crcditur i rcccivcs exactly x,. [a~ is g(d~,d„x;) in Young, 1987 eq.(9)]. No[e that
supermodularity of f and lemma 2.1 implies that a' S d~(d,-x;) G d;.
Pick b that satisfies 0Gó G d~a~, a~`-3ó z0 and a~`-ó z y~. L.et Q: -f;(a' fd fx;;(d;,dt))-x;. Since
a'fó t x;1 a' f x;, the definition of a' and monotonicity of f imply that Q 10. By
supermodularity of f, Q 5 ól2 G ó.
Pick a natural number n that satisfies tt~31 ó. Consider the following (n f2)-creditor problem:
(E~`;d"): - [rix; f2(a~-ó);(dt,d~,d;,d;,... ,d;)]. Note that by construction, the fjust allocation of this
problem is, x'-(a'-ó, a'-ó, x;, x;,...,x;). Indeed, since a~~a'-ózy;, it is easy to see that x'
treats any two creditors f-equally. Now consider the game G~(E~`;d') and the following
subgame-perfect equilibrium a: The proposer, whose claim is dt, proposes allocation x-(a~`fó,
a~`-3ó, x;, x;,...,x;). All the other creditors propose the f-just allocation of the underlying
bankruptcy problem whenever they propose and respond to any offer according to the algorithm
presented in section 4. Note that according to a the largest creditor will reject the offer and the
n small creditors will accept it. If a small creditor rejects offer x, he will neither benefit nor
lose, bu[ the large rejecting creditar will certainly benefit from the small creditor's deviation.
We now show that this equilibrium is not coalition-proof. Consider the following joint deviation
by all the small creditors: all of them reject offer x. By the choice of n, this deviation will
benefit everybody but the proposer. In addition, since the large rejecting creditor will offer the
f-just allocation of the bankruptcy problem associated with the next stage of the game, this
deviation is self-enforcing. o
6. STRICTLY MONOTONE RULES30
The uniqueness resul[ in Theorem 1 is driven by the strict estate monotonicity of rule f with
respect to the highest claim (lemma 2.2). This is why ordering the proposers by sizeof claim
is important. If the proposer's component f, was not strictly monotone in the estate, multiplicity
of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes might arise, as shown by the following example:
Example 6.1: Let (E;d)-(100; (100,100,10)). If f is the constrained equal award rule,
f(E; d)-(45,45,10). Suppose the order of proposers is (3,1,2). The reader can check that all
the outcomes of the fotm (45-a,45ta,10) for -35 5 a 535 can be supported by SPE of the
corresponding extensive form game.
If we confine ourselves to consistent and strictly monotone tules, the main result can be
generalized to any order of proposers with a positive claim. In addition, since strictly monotone
rules are also quasi-strictly monotone, all subgame-perfect equilibria of the generalized game
are coalition-proof. These results are stated fotmally in Theorem 3. Let Q be a compiete order
of the set of creditors. The game GQ(E;d) is defined as in Section 4 with a minor change: the
proposer is the Q-minimal creditor among the active creditors.
TH6oREM 3: L.et (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem. L.et Q be a complete order of the set of
creditors (in which all uro creditors come after the non-zero creditors) and let f be a consistent
and strictly monotone rule. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of GQ(E;d) is
f(E;d). Moreover, all subgame-perfect equilibria of GQ(E;d) are coalition-proof.
Sketch of the Proof: Note that for strictly monotone rules, creditor 1 can be replaced by any
non-zero creditor in lemma 3.6, in the definition of R,~ and in lemmas A.2 and A.3. This
modification, together with the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 prove Theorem 3. o31
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By giving a non-cooperative view of a wide class of bankruptcy rules, we believe we havc
provided additíonal support to the idea that the property of consistency is useful in the Nash
Program for cooperative games. On the other hand, consistency alone, without the assistance
of monotonicity, is insufficient to reach [he results. Thus, construction ofconsistency based non-
cooperative models that support consistent cooperative solution concepts which are not monotone
seems to us a difficult task. Therefore there might be problems in supporting the nucleolus or
the Nash bargaining solution on general pies by means of a non-cooperative model.'o
In the bankruptcy model monotonicity is a natural requirement. Moreover, it is almost
implied by consistency: Young (1987, lemma 1) showed that if a rule is symmetric, continuous
and consistent, then it is also monotone.
It would be desirable to implement bankruptcy rules with a mechanism that dces not
require knowledge of the claims. However, it is not clear how to do this. With its demanding
requirement of feasibility on and off the equilibrium path, the very notion of inechanism is in
trouble when the feasible set is unknown to the planner. This is why the game fotms proposed
in the literature on implementation of social choice correspondences do not work when applied
to our problem. The underlying assumptíon that this literature makes is that preferences are
unknown, but the feasible set is perfectly known to the plattner. In our case, preferences are
known but the set of allocations (based on the claims) is not. We plan to analyze this problem
in a companion paper.
"'Hart and Mas-Colell (1992) support the Nash bargaining solution for general pies via a
noncooperative model, but their model is not "consistency based".32
APPEND(X
LEMwtn A.1: Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem, let f be a consistent and monotone rule and
let x be an allocation in (E;d). Assume there exists a creditor i such that iz,j for all creditors
j. Then z;:-E-E~~;fj(x;-Fx~;(d;,d~)sf;(E;d).
Proo,)~ Denote x'-f(E;d).
Case 1: For all j;ti, x;fx~zx~tx?`. In this case, by consistency and monotonicity
f;[x;fx;;(d;,d~]Zx~ for all j~i. Therefore z;:-E-E~~;f;[x;fx;;(d;,d;)]SE-E;X;x;'-x~`.
Case 2: There exists j~i such that x;tx,Gx~`-fx~`. In this case we have z;:-E-
E;,;f;(x;tx;;(d;,d;))-[x;tx, f;(x;fx;;(d;,d;))]-Et~;~(fk[x;txr;(d;,d~]-xk). Note that [x;tx,-
f;(x;tx;;(d;,d~)]-f;[x;fx~;(d;,d;)]5x~` where the last inequality follows from consistency and
monotonicity of f. Since iz~j, by definition of z„ F,k~;~[fk(x;fxk;(d;,dk))-xrJzO and therefore
z;5xrt. t1
LEMMA A.2: L.et x be an allocation and let i and j be two creditors different from 1. iR,j
implies jz~i.
Proof: If i-j, the result is trivial. Otherwise, take the following allocations among i,j and 1:
z:-[f~(xifx~;(di,dJ]. w;, w~ and z':-[f~(x~fx~;(d~,d~)), ~v„ w~.
Asstune by contradiction that i~,j. This is equivalent to i~~j. By construction, 1-,i, so
by quasi-transitivity of z„ 1 z~j. Again by consttuction, j-,.1. By monotonicity of f, j z~l .
Therefore, j-,1. By lemma 3.6, z is an f-just allocation among the three creditors, in
contradiction to the assumption. o33
LEMMA A.3: L.et (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem, let f be a consistent, monotone and
superrnodular rule and let x be an allocation in (E;d). Assume there exists a set of creditors
N C I`{ 1} such that h: - f(EiENwi,d ~ N) ? x ~ N, then for all i in N, 1 z~i.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that there exists a creditor j E N such that j~xl . L.e[ k be the Ii,,-
minimal creditor in N, that is, for all i E N wkx~ ~ w;x;. Since j ~xl it follows that x~ ~ wk. Since
h z x ~ N, we have that hr ~ w~. By lemma A.2, k ~wi for all i E N. Since h is the fjust allocation
of (E;E NWi;d ~ N), it follows from lemma 3.3 that h; z w; for all i E N. Therefore we have
~iENhi~EiENWi Which is a contradiction. o34
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